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Gini’s transvariation analysis: an application on financial
crises in developing countries
Daniela Bragoli1, Piero Ganugi2, Giancarlo Ianulardo3
Abstract: The damage and the recurrence of financial crises have increased the concern
of investors and policymakers on one hand and the interest of macroeconomists on the
other. This paper presents an original non parametric methodology, whose aim is to give
a very intuitive and rigorous method for variable selection in order to analyze financial
crises. The transvariation analysis compares the distributions of two different groups of
countries (sound and distressed) with respect to a single macroeconomic variable and
selects the indicators on the basis of a low transvariation probability index. The current
account deficit to GDP ratio, differently from other studies on financial crises, seems to
be a suitable variable in discriminating distressed countries from sound ones, and the case
of Argentina and Turkey confirms this finding.
1 Introduction
During the last century, financial crises have been a recurrent and damaging phenomenon
that not only has caused disruption to the affected economies, but also has worsened
agents’ expectations toward a future seen ever more uncertain. A series of panics and
crises happened in the Pre-World War II period, from 1814 up to the Great Depression of
1929 (Calomiris-Gorton 1991), and many others occurred in the Post-World War II period
as the collapse of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary Sys-
tem in 1979 and in 1992, the Mexican crisis of 1995, the Asian Crisis of 1997, the Russian
crisis of 1998, the Argentinean crisis of 2001. Nevertheless as Bordo and Eichengreen
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(2000) show, there were no major crises in the Bretton Woods era, whereas the post-1971
period has experienced numerous and disruptive financial crises. Bordo et al. (2001) find
that financial crises after 1971 are different in terms of frequency and recurrence (only the
period 1920-1930 may be compared with the recent post-1971 era), but in terms of output
losses and length little has changed. The recent period is better than the inter war period,
but still fairly bad. In particular, banking and twin crises (e.g. banking and currency
crises) are more frequent than in every period (except the inter war period) and currency
crises are much more frequent. In addition, they observe that emerging countries are more
prone to crises. This thesis is corroborated by the recent findings of Reinhart and Rogoff
(2009), who stress the weakness of the ’this time is different’ thesis. In particular, it is
an illusion to believe that thanks to better macroeconomic policies and better screening
by lenders ’the world is not likely to again see a major wave of default’. Recent experi-
ence show the recurrence of serial defaults even though some countries thanks to better
institutions are ’graduating’ from a history of serial defaults.
Starting from these stylized facts an obvious concern of empirical research, financial
institutions and private investors has been the predictability of financial crises. Many
academics and also some institutions as the IMF and Standard and Poor’s, have introduced
some indicators (or set of indicators) that could predict financial crises. The scope of
the present analysis is to contribute to this literature on Early Warning Systems (EWS),
by introducing a methodology (transvariation analysis) that is both rigorous and easy
to apply. The result of the present research should induce to devote more attention to
real factors in predicting financial crises, in particular to reassess the importance of the
current account component of the balance of payments, in contrast with the recent almost
exclusive attention to the financial account side. In particular, contrary to the current
stream, which disregards the importance of current accounts deficits, focusing mainly
on the financial account (and the related currency and maturity mismatch), our analysis
suggests that unsound current accounts can strongly predict financial crises and the current
account sharply discriminates between countries that are prone to crises and those who
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are not. The analysis does not underestimate the important recent contributions of Calvo
(1998), who stressed the crucial role played by a weak financial sector, rather we want
to stress that the current account more clearly than the financial account has been a key
factor in distinguishing defaulting countries from sound countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces the role
played by current account in the recent literature on financial crisis.. Sections 3 and 4
focuses on the evolution of EWS in terms of the methodologies used, tasks and main re-
sults. Sections 5 and 6 introduce the transvariation analysis methodology, the application
and present the main results. Section 7 focuses on the importance of the variable current
account in assessing the difference between Argentina and Turkey crisis episodes. Section
8 concludes the article.
2 The role of current account deficits in predicting a crisis
Two big waves of current account deficit hit world economy in the last 30 years: the
first, between the end of the ’70s and early ’80s in Latin America, and the second in
the ’90s in East Asia. Both led to significant crises, the second being even bigger. The
important point is that emerging market crises have large macroeconomic effects. In par-
ticular when capitals flow inward, a country can run large current account deficits but
when capitals flow out the current account has to be rebalanced very quickly, which is
often economically and politically very costly. Indeed domestic spending must decline
or taxes must increase relative to output to re-establish the balance. A fall in domestic
spending generates a decrease in the output of non-tradables, while a rise in the output
of tradables is required to improve the current account. This will occur through a rise in
the price of tradables relative to non-tradables, which corresponds to a depreciation of the
real exchange rate. These effects are painful when much of the domestic debt is denomi-
nated in foreign currency and/or is short term. In the 1980’s emerging market economies
(EMCs) had large current account deficits to GDP ratios. In 1982 in Latin America the
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deficit was 5 percent of GDP and then came the crises inducing the deficit to shrink to
0.3 percent of GDP in 1983. Finally in 1984 Latin America ran a surplus of 0.8 percent
of GDP. However emerging market economies were close to balance between 1983 and
1991, but then came a period of generous market financing to East Asian countries in the
’90s and in 1996 the deficit in East Asia was 2.1 percent of GDP. When the 1997 cri-
sis occurred East Asians were compelled to redress the balance running a surplus of 4.7
p.c.in 19984. In both episodes sudden cessation of capital flows (’sudden stops’) forced
the current account deficit to fall, the exchange rate to depreciate and the output to fall
dramatically. Ever since emerging market economies seem to have learned the lessons
and they were running current account surpluses causing on the other hand what has been
named the problem of ’global imbalances’5, with developed economies heavy indebted
with emerging economies. In other words, EMC’s have realized that the counterpart of
capital inflows was running huge current account deficits, which implied financial crises.
In particular the interaction between irresponsible lending - moral hazard fostered by in-
ternational institutions -, and unregulated borrowing - borrowing short term and in foreign
currency - has proved fatal to emerging market countries. In the last decade the result has
been on one hand to improve the current account sustainability and on the other hand the
fear of running current account deficits. The latter implies that the governments of EMCs
have converted capital inflows in foreign currency reserves.
The role played by current account deficits in triggering a crisis has been central to
many models since the late ’70s. The first generation model of financial crises introduced
by Krugman (1979) who developed for pegged exchange rate regimes a model introduced
by Salant and Henderson (1978) pointed out the relevance of having consistent fiscal
policies and exchange rate regimes6.
Second generation models have been introduced by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) to
4See Williamson (2005) for a detailed account of how current account deficit led to crises in emerging
market countries.
5For an account on global imbalances, its causes and effects see Eichengreen (2007), Edwards (2007),
Wolf (2009).
6Krugman’s model has been perfected by Flood and Garber (1984), who determined the timing of a
crisis.
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deal with EMS crises in the 1990s. The main tenet of these models is that crises are
self-fulfilling phenomena in a context of multiple Nash equilibria. According to these
models, while good fundamentals avoid crises and really bad ones lead to crises, there are
certain intermediate values of fundamentals in which both, the good and the bad scenario,
are possible outcomes. The implications of these models were that having sound current
account does not always guarantee that countries will escape a crisis.
In the last decade many authors have analyzed whether crises were preceded by cur-
rent account deficits or not. Some authors like Radelet and Sachs (1998a, 1998b), have
stressed the role of financial panic as an essential element in exacerbating the crises. The
key elements of the Asian financial crises (AFC) were that the crises were largely unan-
ticipated, they involved considerable lending to debtors that were not protected by state
guarantees, economic fundamentals while not completely sound, were substantially good.
The only critical points such as growing current account deficits, overvalued exchange
rates and slowing export growth were not so serious as to predict an impeding major cri-
sis. Only the financial sector with its large imbalances in the maturity and denomination
of the currency, raised the most serious doubts about the stability of the system. Thus the
crisis is due to co-ordination failure and not to bad fundamentals in the current account.
A different perspective has been put forward by Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999)
who has stressed the role of moral hazard caused by money-back guarantees for depos-
itors and limited liability for lenders that led to excessive investment (over-investment
problem). Thus the problem was not one of panic and failure of co-ordination among
creditors, but one of over-investment. These authors opened the way to third generations
model of crisis, stressing again the role of sound fundamentals.
Both interpretations deserve attention, because they focus on key elements of the East
Asian financial crisis. Radelet and Sachs’ interpretation helps us understanding that some
indicators, usually adopted to screen the presence of distress, are no longer the unique
ones (in particular, budget deficits as to the fiscal policy and interest rates as to the mon-
etary policy), while Corsetti et al. (1999)’s focus on the important role played by moral
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hazard in the financial and corporate system.
Some authors, as Chang and Velasco, have formalized the maturity mismatch prob-
lem, and Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2000, 2001) have focused their attention on the
currency mismatch phenomenon. This last approach has restored the relevance of balance
sheet, though still including the possibility of multiple Nash equilibria7.
Some studies building on Calvo have stressed the role of capital account rather than
current account imbalances. Indeed Calvo (2000) has focused its attention on the vul-
nerability of the balance of payments caused by capital reversals8. He has shown how a
currency crisis is possible even in the absence of a prior current account deficit. Edwards
(2002) conducted a massive investigation on the importance current account and ques-
tioned its relevance, concluding that it is not possible to support the thesis that countries
with high current account deficits (arbitrarily defined) must face a crisis. However he
added that more broadly defined current account deficits - in terms of the costs involved
in running very large deficits - almost inevitably lead to a crisis. Moreover if Africa is
excluded - and Edwards provides reasons to do that - even current account strictly defined
raises the probability of crisis. Finally, he concludes contrary to recent claims suggesting
the irrelevance of current account deficits, ’large deficits should be a cause for concern’9.
These conclusions have been strengthened by further research of the same author (Ed-
wards (2004)).
To summarize, the fear of running current account deficits may be due to the fear of
generating a currency mismatch on the balance sheet; large current account seems to trig-
ger capital outflows, when signals of vulnerability appear either at the domestic or the
7This has led some authors, as Alonso Neira (2005), to question whether we should speak of third
generation or whether these models are just an extension of the two previous ones. But while in the first
generation models a crucial role was played by the fundamentals of the economy (current accounts, fiscal
deficits) in third generation models attention is devoted to banks’, firms’ and the financial sector’s balance
sheet, in order to single out the variable(s) that could help predict the crisis. Third generation models
were developed out of the consideration that crises in the late 1990s occurred in countries with sound
fundamentals, so the weakness was looked for in the banking and financial sector.
8The idea that currency crises are due in our days to capital accounts problems rather than current
account deficit had been presented at the Munich Lectures by Dornbusch in 1998 (see Dornbusch and
Fischer (2003).)
9Edwards (2005) has analysed current account deficits over the period 1970-2002, studying the impli-
cations in terms of GDP loss for the U.S. of redressing the current account deficit.
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international level; re-establishing the balance in the current account requires a depreci-
ation in the real exchange rate, which is painful in the presence of currency mismatches;
the latter is worsened when debt is short term and can easily fly out. Finally the ’fear
of floating’, generated by the desire to avoid currency mismatches has led to underval-
ued exchange and current account surpluses, which is what we currently observe in most
EMCs and on the other has concurred to generate US current account deficits (the US
government knows it will never suffer from the double mismatch occurred to EMCs). In
what follows we want to show that the fear by EMCs is well grounded on the basis of the
fact that the current account deficit is the best predictor of an impending crisis.
3 Non parametric EWS models
Theories on crises are very important in determining the list of economic indicators,
but EWS models have the power of testing whether these indicators are good predictors
of financial crises without estimating any particular speculative attack theory. The Early
Warning Systems models can be divided into three groups in terms of methodologies
used:
• non parametric methodologies (signal approach);
• parametric methodologies (probit-logit, multinomial logit, markov chains);
• non-parametric and parametric methodologies (event studies supplemented by mul-
tivariate regression).
We would like to focus on the non-parametric methodologies since the transvariation
analysis is part of this group. The event studies were used for example by Eichengreen,
Rose and Wyplosz (1995), Frankel and Rose (1996), Edwards and Santaella (1993), and
more recently by Aziz, Caramazza and Salgado (2000). Edwards and Santaella (1993)
combines non parametric tests with cross - country regression to understand 48 devalua-
tions in the developing countries that took place during the Bretton Woods period (1945-
71). The control group consists of the 24 developing countries that maintained a fixed
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nominal exchange rate for at least ten years. They summarize the behavior of some
macroeconomic indicators in the two groups of countries by comparing the statistical
distribution of the two groups, using quartiles.
Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995), Frankel and Rose (1996) combine event study
analysis with the use of the graphical techniques and multivariate regression, the first
paper uses multinomial logit, the second uses probit models, estimated with maximum
likelihood. In both studies the control group is given by the ‘tranquil’ period for the same
group of countries. In the graphical approach, a graph for each variable is constructed
in order to study a particular ‘event’ that can be a currency crash, but also a depreciation
event. A homogeneous group of countries that experienced this event is considered, but
the sample is divided into two groups of observations: the ‘tranquil’ observations, which
constitute the control group, and the observations within a certain window of time that
comprises the event. For each indicator, the average value of the ‘tranquil’ period is
thus compared to the average values around the event and the differences between the
two groups of observations are tested for statistical significance. The advantages of the
event studies methodologies, as underlined by Aziz, Caramazza and Salgado (2000) can
be found in the simplicity of the approach, it does not impose parametric structure on the
data so, on the one hand, it is more informative in extracting patterns of behavior and at
the same time it does not encounter the problems related to statistical inference.
The most significant drawback is the fact that the approach is univariate, though this
problem is usually overcome by supplementing the univariate analysis with more rigor-
ous multivariate regression analysis (generally probit - logit). A second problem with
the graphical event study is that a number of diverse countries are included in the sam-
ple making it difficult to draw conclusions from the average behavior of variables. Aziz,
Caramazza, Salgado (2000) standardize variables with respect to their country specific
means and standard deviations. A third drawback comes from the fact that crisis could be
different, so looking at a common pattern across many different crisis could be informa-
tive, but can also be misleading, because some particular pattern could be dominating the
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common one.
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1997) and Kaminsky (1999) introduce a pure non parametric
approach to evaluate the usefulness of several variables in signaling an impending crisis.
It can be interpreted as an extension of the methodology used in event studies. The aim
of this approach is to monitor the evolution of a number of economic variables, when
one of these variables deviates from its ‘normal’ level beyond a certain ‘threshold’ value,
this is taken as a warning signal about a possible currency crisis within a specified period
of time. For each country, crises are identified ex post by the behavior of an index of
exchange market pressure, the signaling horizon is the period within which the indicators
would be expected to have an ability for anticipating crises (defined a priori 24 months)
and the ‘threshold’ levels are chosen so as to strike a balance between the risks of having
many false signals and the risk of missing many crisis. The ‘thresholds’ are chosen in
relation to the percentiles of the distribution of observations of the indicator for each
country. Once the critical ‘threshold’ is chosen, the indicators considered are transformed
into binary signals: if a given indicator crosses a critical ‘threshold’ it is said to send a
signal. After having ranked the indicators according to their ability to predict crises while
producing few false alarms, the signal approach also tabulates for each of the indicators
considered, the average number of months in advance of the crisis when the first signal
occurs and the level of persistence of the indicator.
The main drawbacks of this approach are that a variable can send a signal at whatever
distance from the critical ‘threshold’ and that the approach is again univariate. In order
to overcome these problems together with other problems, Kaminsky (2006) introduces
a multivariate signaling approach, which overcomes the unknown non-linearity that char-
acterizes the crisis phenomena and that is not considered in previous methodologies. The
non-linearity comes from two different sources. The first is the disconnect between the
different varieties of crisis and ‘the one fits all’ approach imposed by the previous tech-
niques. Some indicators, for example, may not be important to explain all the crisis, but
could be of key importance for a subgroup of observations. The second source comes
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from the fact that crisis becomes more likely as the number of fragilities increases. The
difference between the multivariate signaling approach and the univariate signaling is ex-
plained by the way ‘thresholds’ are identified, in the latter they are obtained indicator
by indicator, in the former they are identified jointly. The new methodology (the regres-
sion tree analysis) allows the data to determine the number and characteristics of classes
of crisis. The observations are first divided into those observations in periods of crisis
and observations in ‘tranquil’ times. As in the univariate signal approach, the algorithm
chooses a ‘threshold’ for each indicator to minimize its noise-to-signal ratio, then the in-
dicator with the lowest ratio is selected. All the observations are then separated into two
groups: those for which the chosen indicator is signaling and those for which the chosen
indicator is not signaling and for each group the methodology is repeated. To avoid the
perfect fit, the regression tree analysis imposes a penalty on the number of varieties. The
adjusted R2 criterion is used to measure the improvement due to the identification of a
new variety. If the penalty exceeds the improvement, the algorithm chooses the previous
number of varieties; otherwise the algorithm continues to partition the sample.
4 What variables do EWS models consider important predictors?
Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995) find that devaluation are preceded by political
instability, budget and current account deficits and fast growth of money and prices, in
contrast they find that few consistent correlations link regime transition like flotation or
fixing to macroeconomic or political variables and they conclude that there are no clear
early warning signals of many speculative attacks. Edwards and Santaella (1993) em-
phasize on the importance of domestic credit and fiscal policy expansion indicators, but
also the worsening of the current account deficit and the capital flight in understanding
the 69 devaluation episodes object of their study. Frankel Rose (1996) show, in line with
most studies, both with graphical and regression analysis, that crashes tend to occur when
FDI inflows dry up, when reserves are low, when domestic credit growth is high, when
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world interest rates rise and when real exchange rate show overevaluation. On the other
hand they put in evidence that current account deficits and government budget deficits
do not play a role in explaining crashes. Kaminsky (1999), using the signaling approach,
provides some information on the performance of individual indicators in forecasting cur-
rency and banking crises. If we consider only currency crises then, according to Kamin-
sky (1999), high world interest rates, together with increasing gross foreign debt (the
ratio of domestic residents’ liabilities in banks overseas to foreign exchange reserves),
positive capital flight (the ratio of domestic residents’ assets in banks overseas to foreign
exchange reserves) and the ratio of short term maturity foreign debt to total foreign debt
(which captures liquidity problems) are good indicators. If we consider banking crises,
then the best indicators are the ones linked to the liberalization of the capital account and
the domestic financial sector (M2 multiplier, domestic credit/GDP and stock prices). The
indicators that can be excluded from Kaminsky’s (1999) univariate analysis are: lend-
ing/deposit rate ratio, imports and bank deposits. We would like to notice that the current
account deficit/GDP is not part of the list of variables considered by Kaminsky (1999),
but other indicators such as exports, imports, the terms of trade and the real exchange rate
are analyzed as those variables that are linked with current account problems.10 The ‘new
generation’ of EWS models tend to focus more on the ability of the models of predict-
ing the timing of the crises (Bussiere Fratzscher, 2006) or on the ability of the models to
explain the different varieties of crises (Kaminsky 2006 and Arias and Erlandsson 2005)
rather than focusing on the macroeconomic indicators.
5 Transvariation analysis: where do we stand?
As in the event studies, we consider those variables that are suggested by the theory liter-
ature on financial crises, in the period that leads up to the event we are interested in. We
use annual data and we compare the behavior of two groups of countries: the group of de-
3See Kaminsky (1999) for the full list of indicators considered.
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veloping countries that experienced a crisis and the group of sound developed countries.
Our aim is not to predict the timing of a crisis, but we find much more useful, for policy
implications, to study the behavior of macroeconomic indicators that can be controlled by
policymakers and to study them enough time in advance in order to be able to implement
the right changes. The approach is non parametric, gaining all the advantages of non para-
metric techniques, and very simple to understand and implement thus in a rigorous way.
We consider different episodes of crisis that have different characteristics so we are in-
terested in searching the common elements. Our approach does not depend on arbitrarily
chosen ‘thresholds’ as the signaling approach, but we base our analysis on the calcula-
tion of a transvariation probability index that measures the overlapping area between the
distributions of the two group of countries considered with respect to each economic in-
dicator. The approach is univariate, but a multivariate version of transvariation analysis,
that takes into account the correlation between variables, can be implemented.
The basic idea of transvariation analysis we would like to explain in this paper is
quite simple. Let us suppose to face a whole of units (men, families, firms), characterized
by several variables (rate of blood pressure, cholesterol level, but also, financial ratios,
patrimonial indicators) divide them into two groups, respectively healthy and unhealthy
men, distressed and sound firms, safe and insolvent families. Once we report the two
density distributions of each variable, each for the two groups, on the same graph, we
observe different overlapping areas: the transvariation area. If now we imagine to ignore
which of the two groups the different units share, but at the same time we have the task
of classifying correctly the units in the two groups by means of only one variable, we
can properly do this by choosing the variable whose overlapping area - transvariation
- is quite small. Transvariation analysis has been developed by Gini (1916, 1951) in
connection with zoological and anthropometric studies. Deutsch and Silber (1997) has
used transvariation analysis to study income distribution in Israel. Skirmantas (2005) has
used the same approach to verify the physical difference between autistic and healthy
children with reference to the two distributions of serotonin. Another approach similar to
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the analysis of transvariation is the ‘affinity analysis’ developed by Bhattacharyya (1943),
Matusita (1956), Kratzanowski (1995). In the following subsections we will describe the
methodology used in detail.
5.1 The methodology: transvariation analysis
Let xi be any quantitative variable (height, weight, income, inflation, etc.) and K and H
two groups of units (men, women, firms, countries, etc.), composed with respect to the
same variable, of numerousness n and m. We then define:
• x1,k, x2,k, ..., xn,k as the ordered measures of the units composing group K;
• x1,h, x2,h, ..., xm,h as the ordered measures of the units composing group H.
Chosen the median as the mean value of the distributions, let us assume that the following
inequality holds:
Mk > Mh. (1)
Given (1), if we compare each unit of group K with each unit of group H, getting a total
of n · m comparisons, we have that some comparisons obey the following inequality
xi,k > xj,h, (2)
others respect this relation
xi,k = xj,h (3)
and finally others follow this inequality
xi,k < xj,h, (4)
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Figure 1: Transvariation area
where i = 1,2,..., n and j = 1,2,..., m. We have transvariation when a part of the com-
parisons obeys to inequality (4). From a graphical point of view it is possible to draw
the transvariation area for relations (2) and (4). If xi,k > xj,h, for each of the n · m
comparisons, the density distribution of group K is completely separated from the den-
sity distribution of group H. Alternatively, if for some cases xi,k < xj,h, the two density
distributions are characterized by an overlapping area, the area of transvariation. If for a
high number of cases xi,k < xj,h, then the two density distributions are characterized by
a large overlapping area, which corresponds to a lower variable’s discriminating power.
Rising degrees of transvariation are depicted in figure 1.
The distributions are very well shaped, but this is not a necessary prerequisite of
transvariation analysis, being this statistical tool essentially non parametric and, therefore,
independent from whatever hypothesis on the distributions of the groups. The transvaria-
tion probability index is defined with respect to the median as the following ratio:
2 · (Th,k/n · m) (5)
where:
• Th,k is the number of cases of transvariation, increased by half of the number of
cases in which xi,k = xj,h;
• n · m is the number of possible comparisons.
The index is defined in the interval [0,1]. Increasing values of the index involve larger
and larger overlapping areas. In the case of equal medians, which imply a perfect over-
lapping of the two distributions, the index assumes value 1. At the opposite, decreasing
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Figure 2: Different causes of transvariation
values of the index are associated with lower and lower overlapping areas. For value of
the index equal to zero the two distributions are perfectly separated. The probability of
transvariation derives from 3 different causes:
• the distance between the medians of the two groups;
• the degree of variability of the variable;
• the shape of the density distributions.
Given the same variability and the same shape of the two distributions, a lower distance
between the medians can produce transvariation. If, on the contrary, we have the same
distance between the medians and the same shape of the two density distributions, it is
the different variability that can cause transvariation. Finally, given the same distance
between the medians and the same variability, transvariation can be primed by a change
in the shape. The different causes of transvariation are depicted in figure 2.
5.2 A dynamic integration: speed of run
Transvariation analysis is a relevant expedient to individualize a correct variable in order
to classify correctly two groups of statistical units - countries - according to a precise
profile, which is to be or not proximate to default in our case. Once individualized the
correct variable it is necessary to explain how to use it correctly in a dynamic and not only
static framework. It can in fact happen that the available information is not only supplied
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for one ‘point’, but also for a span of time as it happens in macroeconomics where the
national accounts of a country are available for a series of years. Our suggestion is to use
the speed of run. This is the number of times - years in national accounts - the chosen
predictive variable maintains the same sign. The change of the sign involves a new begin
of the counting. Rationale of this procedure is that the persistence of the sign is a proof
of an increasing intensity of the variable and vice versa. In table 1 we supply different
examples, assuming the predictive power has negative sign. The time is represented by 6
years.
Table 1: Speed of run
year 1 year 2 year 3 year 4 year 5 year of crisis speed of run
- - - - - - 6
- - - + + - 1
+ + - - - - 4
- + - + - - 2
- - - - - + 0
6 The application
Imagine to position on a univariate plane two groups of countries (sound and distressed)
in a period of time before their financial distress, with respect to each macroeconomic
variable. Gini’s transvariation analysis measures the distance (in terms of overlapping)
between the distributions of the two groups. The methodology selects those variables
that better separate the two groups of countries not only in a static, but also in a dynamic
framework. Through this methodology only the variables that determine an increasing
distance between the two groups, as the year of crisis approaches, are considered the
most informative variables for financial distress analysis. In the following application, we
would like to focus on two different samples, the first sample reflects the most recent and
serious crisis episodes that are linked with default or deep financial and currency crisis
that occurred in the nineties, while the second is taken from Frankel and Rose (1996)
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dataset which comprises more than one hundred countries.
6.1 The first sample: deep financial and currency crisis of the nineties
In this first sample we construct the group of distressed countries considering, on one
side, those that officially and unilaterally declared the impossibility of foreign debt repay-
ment (capital and/or interests) toward other countries or private parties, such as Argentina
(2001), Ivory Coast (2000), Peru (2000), Ecuador, Venezuela, Russia, Ukraine, Pakistan
(1998), Indonesia (1997) and, on the other side, all those countries that, even though they
did not go bankrupt, had to face deep financial and currency crises which determined
serious consequences on their entire economic system, such as Mexico (1994 - 1995),
Malaysia, Philippines, Korea, Thailand (1997) and Brazil (1999).11 We construct the
group of sound countries considering the developed countries in a tranquil year (1999).12
We choose to consider the group of sound countries as control instead of the ’tranquil’
period because on one hand we are confident of the fact that developed countries can be
considered sound and, on the other hand, we would like to avoid imprecise and ad hoc def-
initions of ’tranquil’ periods, that might bias the results. In practice we also consider the
information coming from the ’tranquil’ periods by comparing the results of transvariation
analysis through time in the span that precedes the year of crisis as it will be emphasized in
the next section. Both the theoretical and the empirical literature suggest different symp-
toms to crisis: expansionary monetary and fiscal policies, recessions, real exchange rate
appreciations, high inflation, exaggerated credit-cycles, loss of competitiveness and dete-
rioration of the current account, high domestic and foreign interest rates etc. According
to these different symptoms we can divide the macroeconomic indicators as follows:
• overborrowing (domestic credit/GDP);
• growth slowdown (GDP growth, real deposit rate);
11We consider the year of the crisis and the previous four years.
12The developed countries considered are: Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Ireland,
Spain, Italy, Germany, France, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, the UK, Iceland, Finland, Aus-
tralia, Japan, Canada, New Zealand.
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• capital account indicators (reserve variation, M2/reserves);
• current account indicators (current account deficit/GDP, trade balance/GDP, invest-
ment/GDP);
• monetary indicators (M2/GDP, M2/reserves, nominal deposit rate, real deposit rate,
inflation).13
We consider the variation of all these variables (except GDP growth, CAD/GDP, TB/GDP),
in accordance with Kaminsky (1999), in order to avoid the implicit heterogeneity between
the two groups (driven by the fact that we are comparing developed and developing coun-
tries) that the variables in levels would imply and that would bias the results. In particular,
if we consider the variables in levels, for some indicators, the distributions between the
two groups of countries would not overlap. This finding is highly influenced by the fact
that the variables in levels emphasize a comparison between developed and developing
countries, more than a comparison between the ’sound’ and the ’distressed’.
6.2 The second sample: Frankel and Rose dataset
We construct the second sample from Frankel and Rose (1996) annual data on developed
countries from 1971 to 1992 and we define the currency crises as a depreciation of the
nominal exchange rate of 25 p.c. that is also at least a 10 p.c. increase in the rate of change
of nominal depreciation. The sample is constructed similarly to Frankel and Rose (1996)
by considering for each country all the observations starting from the year of the crisis
up to three years before. The total observations we have for each variable are 261. For
the group of developed countries 14 we consider the years 2004,2005 and 2006 in order to
maximize data availability. The variables considered are also very similar to Frankel and
Rose (1996), we can divide them as follows:
• debt variables (the ratio of external debt to GDP, short term debt to external debt,
government debt to external debt);
13The source of these indicators is IMF International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 2001.
14Australia, Finland, Japan, Spain, Austria, France, Luxembourg, Sweden, Belgium, Germany, the
Netherlands, Switzerland, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the UK, Denmark, Italy, Norway
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• current account indicators (current account deficit/GDP, investment/GDP);
• capital account indicators (reserve variation);
• monetary indicators (M2 growth and inflation);
• a measure of the over borrowing (domestic credit to GDP);
• a measure of recession (GDP growth); 15
All the variables except CAD (current account deficit) and investment/GDP are in vari-
ation terms. Comparing the two datasets we can say that the first dataset covers a small
number of relevant crises and the statistical analysis can be compared through time, while
the second dataset covers a vast number of observations, it refers to a less restrictive defi-
nition of crises and the statistical analysis cannot be compared through time.
7 Results for the first sample
In this paragraph we would like to present the main results referred to the first sample
of most recent crises, focusing on the quartile analysis - which captures a preliminary
comparison between the two distributions - on the transvariation probability indexes and
finally on the speed of run. As specified in the previous paragraph, even though the quar-
tile analysis should be very close to the transvariation probability index results, the index
is more rigorous because it includes all those cases in which the causes of transvariation
are not linked to a lower distance of the medians and quartiles, but to a different variability
or a different shape of the two distributions.
7.1 Quartile analysis
Table 2 reports the quartile analysis results for each variable . We can see that from the
table it is possible to compare the distributions of the distressed countries up to 4 years
before the crisis, and also the same distributions with the control group. We find this table
very informative, because it pictures the difference in terms of values, between sound
15The source of these indicators is World Bank, World Bank Development Indicators.
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and distressed countries and permits to understand the evolution in time of each variable
approaching the crisis. The reserves’ variation becomes negative, the ratio M2/reserves
increases, domestic credit/GDP - which is an indicator of the fragility of the banking
system and also an indicator of the amount of money supply - together with M2/GDP
and the real deposit rate, increases. GDP growth, which is an indicator of recession, and
inflation decreases. The current account deficit (CAD)/GDP becomes more and more
negative approaching the crisis year and the distribution of the distressed countries moves
away from the distribution of the sound countries. Investment/GDP and saving/GDP,
which can be interpreted as the causes of the deficit, behave in a heterogeneous way.
In particular, for these two indicators, the third quartile overlaps with the distribution
of the sound countries. The trade balance/GDP is characterized by an almost complete
overlapping of the distributions.
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7.2 Transvariation probability index
From the transvariation analysis point of view, we can discriminate the macroeconomic
indicators into three categories. According to the quartile analysis applied to the first
category of indicators (trade balance/GDP, investment/GDP, savings/GDP, M2/GDP, real
deposit rate, domestic credit/GDP and inflation) the distressed group’s quartiles are not
at all separated from the control group’s quartiles. This means that the distributions of
the two groups of countries, with respect to each of these indicators, overlap. The second
group of variables (GDP pro capita, nominal deposit rate and reserve variation) present
an ambiguous behavior, the quartiles of the distressed are separated only some years.
GDP pro capita and the nominal deposit rate present a low degree of overlapping of the
quartiles only in the year of the crisis,the reserve variation only four years before. The
third couple of variables (CAD/GDP and M2/reserves) by means of the quartile analy-
sis, do not appear strongly overlapping and should be studied further. Tables 3 shows
the transvariation probability indexes respecting the categories selected by the quartile
analysis. The rejected variables from the quartile analysis, are the ones labeled ‘high
transvariation’, showing the fact that quartile analysis can be considered an elementary
analysis of transvariation. The variables that, according to the quartile analysis had a
partial or very little overlapping area, are the ones labeled ‘low transvariation’. The low
transvariation probability index is a necessary, but not sufficient condition in order to es-
tablish the predictive power of the single variable. The index, in fact, should be not only
low, but also monotonically decreasing in time as the crisis approaches. From a descrip-
tive statistics point of view this means that the overlapping area between the distribution
of the two groups of countries diminishes with respect to that indicator. Reading table 3,
we notice that both CAD/GDP and M2/reserves transvariation probability indexes dimin-
ish as we approach the year of the crisis. According to both variables the distribution of
the distressed group of countries becomes more and more distant from the distribution of
the sound countries approaching the year of the crisis, but CAD/GDP seems to be the best
indicator because it presents the lowest values of the index starting from two years be-
21
fore the crisis. Finally table 2 lists those variables that have an ‘ambiguous behavior’, i.e.
those variables that present high and low transvariation indexes that are not at all linked
with the proximity of the crisis, the indexes do not monotonically decrease and cannot be
considered as good predictive variables.
7.3 The speed of run
Once individualized the correct variable (CAD/GDP) it is necessary to explain how to
use it correctly in a dynamic and not only static framework. Rationale of this procedure
is that the persistence of the sign is a proof of an increasing intensity of the variable
and vice versa. Most of the distressed countries experienced current account deficits for
a long span of years continuously. Their speed of run is consequently very high. The
most prominent cases are those of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Peru and
above all Argentina. The speed of run has been more modest for Korea and Ecuador,
for Ukraine we don’t have all the data and in Mexico’s case we only consider four years
before the crisis. The great exception is Russia and Venezuela with speed zero (even if
its surpluses decrease monotonically). In table 4 the current account sign and the speed
of run score are reported. The speed of run helps also to understand why Turkey - a very
relevant country according to the size of its economy, population and exposure toward the
international financial system - has been wrongly classified as risky as other South-East
Asian countries and Argentina. Factors at the base of this misleading classification are:
hyperinflation, very high public deficit, recurrent deficit of current accounts in time. This
wide spread misunderstanding of Turkey’s probability of default is immediately corrected
if the speed of run is considered. From table 4 we notice the difference in the score
between Turkey (2) and Argentina (10).
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8 Results: Frankel and Rose (1996) dataset
This section reports the results related to the rich sample taken from Frankel and Rose
(1996), that is defined on a more ’loose’ definition of country crisis. The results are
summarized only by the transvariation probability index, seeing as we are considering all
the observations in a span of time that goes from three years before the crisis to the year
of the crisis. From the transvariation probability index we notice that also in this sample,
the variable CAD/GDP has the most informative power compared to the other variables
its index is 0.44, which means a low degree of overlap between the distributions of sound
and distressed countries. The growth of M2 and the GDP pro capita growth also present
a relatively low transvariation probability index.
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9 Conclusions and further research
In this paper we have made use of a statistical methodology called ‘transvariation analy-
sis’, developed by the Italian statistician C. Gini, to study and assess the predictive power
of macroeconomic variables in the forecast of financial crises in developing countries.
Two groups of countries, sound and distressed, have been formed. For each country com-
posing the two groups we selected a range of macroeconomic indicators, broadly used
in the literature, and then, with these indicators, we constructed a correspondent cou-
ple of distributions with respect to the two groups of countries. Because the core of
transvariation analysis is the measurement of the overlapping of the two distributions our
procedure is made of three steps. The first is the comparison of the quartiles of the dis-
tributions according to which a subset of variables - trade balance/GDP, investment/GDP,
savings/GDP, M2/GDP, Domestic Credit/GDP, Inflation - has been eliminated. The sec-
ond step is the calculation of the transvariation probability index in the four years leading
to the crisis. The predictive power of the index has to involve low and decreasing val-
ues of it. According to this step the CAD to GDP ratio has been selected as the highest
predictive power indicator of financial crisis. Because the distressed country analysis is
developed on the basis of several years, it is necessary to join the use of the current ac-
count deficit variable with the counting of its speed of run. As data confirms the score
of the speed supplies a good measure of the intensity of current account deficit in time.
In order to test the robustness of this result on a different sample, we decided to calcu-
late the transvariation probability index on Frankel and Rose (1996) sample of over one
hundred developing countries that experienced a currency crash (measured in terms of a
substantial depreciation of the nominal exchange rate). Even considering this broad defi-
nition of crisis we have proved that CAD/GDP is still the macroeconomic indicator with
the highest predictive power according to this statistical methodology. Because Gini also
extended the analysis of transvariation to the case of two and more variables, it might
be fruitful in the future to apply the multivariate version of this statistical tool to select a
multivariate leading indicator for financial crises. The aim of multivariate transvariation
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analysis is to create a composite variable (or artificial variable) that synthesizes the single
variables. The first step is to project the units of the two groups of countries (distressed
and sound), which are now n-dimensional units, on a line, the second step is to apply uni-
variate transvariation analysis to the two groups of countries with respect to the artificial
variable created.
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Table 2: Quartile analysis by variable
trade balance/GDP investment/GDP (variation)
-4 years -2 years crisis control -4 years -2 years crisis control
1Q -3.6 -4.0 -0.3 -2.1 1Q -5.0 -5.3 -9.9 -1.0
Me -0.5 -0.3 2.8 2.3 Me -1.0 -0.9 -4.5 0.7
3Q 3.4 5.2 8.1 4.1 3Q 3.4 2.6 1.3 2.8
savings/GDP (variation) GDP growth
-4 years -2 years crisis control -4 years -2 years crisis control
1Q -7.2 -11.0 -4.9 -7.2 1Q 2.8 -1.6 -18.0 1.7
Me -0.4 -0.9 -2.6 -0.5 Me 8.7 8.9 -5.1 3.1
3Q 5.2 1.1 1.4 2.3 3Q 13.1 15.8 -2.1 4.1
reserves variation CAD/GDP
-4 years -2 years crisis control -4 years -2 years crisis control
1Q 8.4 -11.3 -37.3 -30.7 1Q -4.5 -6.2 -4.5 -1.7
Me 20.2 13.0 -22.6 -10.4 Me -3.2 -3.2 -3.0 1.2
3Q 34.0 31.3 -10.3 12.0 3Q -1.3 -1.9 -1.8 4.0
M2/reserves (variation) real deposit rate (variation)
-4 years -2 years crisis control -4 years -2 years crisis control
1Q -18.5 -11.7 4.0 -13.1 1Q -59.2 -81.9 -59.3 -47.1
Me -1.2 1.3 24.4 -9.4 Me -2.2 29.6 -3.9 -30.0
3Q 2.0 25.6 38.8 -2.0 3Q 2.7 83.6 94.4 -15.3
domestic credit/GDP (variation) M2/GDP (variation)
-4 years -2 years crisis control -4 years -2 years crisis control
1Q -1.8 -1.3 -3.7 -5.1 1Q -11.1 -2.9 -3.5 -3.2
Me 4.3 4.2 6.6 3.0 Me 2.6 3.8 0.0 1.1
3Q 8.1 9.0 16.2 4.3 3Q 12.6 6.8 7.6 6.0
nominal deposit rate(variation) inflation (variation)
-4 years -2 years crisis control -4 years -2 years crisis control
1Q -22.6 -11.0 1.8 -33.2 1Q -28.9 -51.4 -27.7 -33.4
Me -5.1 0.7 12.7 -20.0 Me 0.0 -15.5 -2.2 -0.5
3Q 0.0 13.7 44.0 -12.3 3Q 24.6 9.2 46.3 32.0
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Table 3: Transvariation probability index
high transvariation
-4 years -3 years -2 years -1 year crisis
Trade Balance/GDP 0.84 0.75 0.90 0.90 0.79
Investment/GDP(variation) 0.80 0.90 0.85 0.91 0.57
Savings/GDP(variation) 1 0.93 0.91 0.85 0.92
M2/GDP 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.44 1.00
Domestic credit/GDP 0.83 0.92 0.82 0.53 0.74
Inflation (variation) 0.93 0.91 0.78 0.72 0.93
low transvariation
-4 years -3 years -2 years -1 year crisis
CAD/GDP 0.54 0.46 0.49 0.40 0.41
M2/reserves 0.84 0.61 0.69 0.49 0.41
high and low transvariation
-4 years -3 years -2 years -1 year crisis
Reserves variation 0.57 0.71 0.69 0.72 0.70
Nominal Deposit rate (variation) 0.64 0.82 0.51 0.66 0.19
Real Deposit rate (variation) 0.62 0.94 0.58 0.77 0.73
GDP pro capita growth 0.55 0.34 0.66 0.90 0.29
Table 4: Speed of run of the current account deficit
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 score
Indonesia - - - - - - - - + + + 7
Malaysia - - - - - - - - + + + 7
Philippines - - - - - - - - + + + 7
Korea - - - + - - - - + + + 3
Thailand - - - - - - - - + + + 7
Pakistan - - - - - - - - - - - 8
Brazil n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. - - - - - - - 5
Mexico - - - - - - - - - - - 4
Ecuador - - - - - - + - - + n.a. 1
Venezuela + + - - + + + + - + + 0
Russia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. + + + + - + + 0
Ukraine n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. - - - - + n.a. 3
Ivory Coast - - - - - - - - - n.a. - 9
Peru - - - - - - - - - - - 10
Argentina + - - - - - - - - - - 10
Turkey n.a. n.a n.a. n.a. n.a - - - + - - 2
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GDP pro capita growth 0.65




Short term debt (p.c. GDP) 0.95
External debt (p.c GDP) 0.97
Inflation (variation) 1
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